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NOTES
Constitutional Law - Aptheker v. Secretary of State
Freedom of Movement and a New Approach
to the Constitutionality of Statutes
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE FREEDOM
The United States was first concerned with freedom of movement
as it pertained to travel among the several states. The Articles of Con-
federation, article IV, provided that, "the people of each state shall
have free ingress and regress to and from any other state." The Con-
stitution deleted this phrase, and no mention of freedom of move-
ment is made therein.
The Supreme Court mentioned the freedom of movement as early
as 1867.' Nevada had enacted a capitation tax of one dollar upon
every person leaving the state by a vehicle for hire, the proprietor
of such a vehicle to pay the tax. The Supreme Court held this statute
unconstitutional, saying that a citizen "has the right to come to the
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that gov-
ernment or to transact any business he may have with it.' The Court
held that a citizen had a natural or inherent right to the freedom
of movement. Although the commerce clause was considered a possi-
ble rationale,' the Court rejected the use of that theory. Many years
later the freedom of movement was reiterated in Edwards v. Cali-
fornia,4 in which a statute attempting to discourage entry by un-
welcome, indigent settlers during the depression was invalidated as
an undue burden on interstate commerce. In neither case was the
statute held to violate the due process clause.
There was little early litigation on the freedom to travel abroad
because the freedom to leave the United States, except in times of
war, was seldom denied a citizen of this country prior to the 1950's.
"Until less than forty years ago this right was completely enjoyed
by American citizens."' In Urtetiqui v. DSArbel,' the Supreme Court
'Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
'Id. at 44. The dissent favored the commerce clause as the basis for the decision.
3 Id. at 41-42. This case is often cited as one decided under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, although no mention of that clause is made in the case. See Cushman & Cush-
man, Cases in Constitutional Law 542 (1958).
4 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The dissent this time favored the "privileges and immunities"
clause as a rationale.
I Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, 193 (1956).
e,4 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835).
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had held that a passport was not necessary for foreign travel but was
merely a request to a foreign nation that the bearer pass safely and
freely. A passport, as a means of identification, might help one obtain
special privileges abroad, but it did no more. Ironically, only Czarist
Russia required passports.!
II. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL
The first limitation on outward freedom of movement was imposed
by Congress in 1918, when passports were required for foreign travel
during the war.' The statute was revived during World War II,' and
in 1952 it was re-enacted so that it could be invoked not only in time
of war, but also in the time of any national emergency proclaimed
by the President."0 A proclamation of a national emergency has con-
tinued in effect until this time and, thus, passports are currently
required for foreign travel." The question has become not one of
the right to travel but of the right to a passport to travel. Congress
also enacted a provision that, "the Secretary of State may grant and
issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate
and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other
person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."1 From the word-
ing of this grant of sole authority, it was assumed that the Secretary
of State had complete discretionary power. Thus passports were
denied merely because "travel abroad at this time would be con-
trary to the best interest of the United States."'" No hearing was
given and no particular reason was required to deny a passport under
these arbitrary proceedings.
In Bauer v. Acheson, 4 the courts first examined this highly arbi-
trary procedure, and the federal district court held that "due process"
required a hearing before the revocation of a passport. A subsequent
court of appeals decision held that, without precise findings by the
'Chafee, op. cit. supra note 5, at 193.
a An Act to Prevent in Time of War Departure from or Entry into the United States
contrary to the Public Safety, 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
'An Act to Amend the Act of May 22, 1918, 55 Stat. 252 (1941).
1066 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1958). This is the present statute regarding
passports. "[D]uring the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President
* ' * it shall . . . be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or
enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport."
"Proc. No. 3004, 67 Stat. C31 (1953).
12 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. 5 1185(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.) Since previously
a passport was not a legal prerequisite to foreign travel, many federal, state and local
officials issued letters in the nature of passports. To avoid this practice, Congress enacted
what is presently the major passport statute providing that the Secretary of State alone
may issue passports under such rules as the President may designate. This general statute is
supplemented by the following rules: 22 C.F.R. §5 51.135-51.170 (1958).
laBoudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
14 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
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Secretary of State, the record lacked substantial evidence to support
his action."
In 1958 when the application of one Kent for a passport was
refused according to regulations of the Secretary of State which
denied issuance of passports to Communists,"0 the Supreme Court for
the first time based the freedom of travel on the due process clause.
"The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which they cannot
be deprived without the due process of law under the fifth amend-
ment."'" This statement reaffirmed the one by a court of appeals in
Shachtman v. Dulles that "freedom to leave a country or a hemis-
phere is as much a part of liberty as freedom to leave a state."' 8
The Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles" did not decide the con-
stitutional question of whether passports could be withheld solely be-
cause of Communist Party membership without denying due process
of law. Instead, the Court held that Congress had not delegated to
the Secretary of State the authority to deny passports because of
political beliefs and associations, reasoning that, under the general
language of the present passport statute,0 the only grounds for re-
fusal were related to the citizenship of the applicant or to his unlaw-
ful conduct. With this stand of precedents and this constitutional
question still undecided, the path was clear for the decision of
Aptheker v. Secretary of State."'
III. APTHEKER v. SECRETARY OF STATE
Aptheker involved the constitutionality of section 6 of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950 which provides that: "when
a Communist organization . . . is registered or there is in effect a
final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it
shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowl-
edge or notice that such organization is so registered or that such
order has become final-(1) to make application for a passport . . .
or, (2) to use or attempt to use any such passport.""2 Section 6 be-
came operative on October 20, 1961, when the Subversive Activities
Control Board directed the Communist Party to register." Aptheker
"Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1622 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-51.170 (1958).
' 7Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). (Emphasis added.).
"8225 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
11357 U.S. 116 (1958).
2066 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. S 1185 (1958). See note 12 suPra.
"378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2264 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958). (Emphasis added.) "Communist
organization" is defined in 64 Stat. 990 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958).
" The registration was upheld in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961). The Court held that the provision was regula-
tory not prohibitory, and that it did not make unlawful pursuit of the objectives defined,
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and Flynn, top-ranking party leaders, were notified thereafter of the
revocation of their passports. Under the 1952 regulations" set up
following the Bauer decision,' appellants received hearings and after
an unfavorable decision appealed to the Board of Passport Appeals.
Subsequently, a three-judge federal court upheld the validity of the
statute.26
In the Aptheker opinion, written by Mr. Justice Goldberg, the
Supreme Court applies the familiar principle that "the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,
unduly to infringe the protected freedom.""7 Protection of the na-
tional security is a valid end," but "precise regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious free-
doms."2 Thus, the Court looks at a regulation from two points of
view: whether the end is sufficiently important to justify a restric-
tion of liberty, and whether the means used are the least drastic with
which effective regulation can be achieved. Although the purpose of
national defense is admittedly a valid one, the statute in Aptheker
sweeps too broadly across the freedom of travel and thus violates the
due process clause for several reasons. Most significant among these
reasons is the fact that publication in the Federal Register that an
organization has been denominated subversive is inadequate notice
to a member that a subsequent application for or use of a passport
will subject him to criminal punishment. In suggesting additional
reasons, the Court proposes consideration of: (1) the degree of
activity, (2) commitment to purpose, (3) the purpose of travel,
and (4) the security-sensitivity of the destination. Using all these
criteria, Mr. Justice Goldberg determines that the statute is uncon-
stitutional "on its face," and refuses to consider its application solely
to Aptheker and Flynn.
A. Notice
For a valid, nondiscriminatory regulation of protected liberties
there must be adequate notice that defendant is subject to the regu-
lation. Thus, if membership in an organization is the sole criterion for
2422 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-51.170 (19518).
""Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). See note 14, supra.
"
8 Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1963).2
1Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). The Supreme Court recently
pointed out that, "[T]his Court has repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to con-
trol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). See also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
"s Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1962).
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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limiting the freedom of an individual, a substantial relationship be-
tween the individual and the organization must be shown." With
notice defined in section 13 (k) of the act as "publication in the
Federal Register of the fact of registration or issuance of a final order
to register,"3 the act applies whether or not "any member" knows
he is associated with what is deemed to be a "Communist-action" or
a "Communist-front" organization. The act also applies whether or
not a member knows the aims of the world Communist conspiracy.
Supreme Court cases have consistently held that before sanctions may
be based upon membership, a member of the Communist Party must
have knowledge of the aims of that party."2 Wieman v. Updegraff
first enunciated the principle that "indiscriminate classification of
the innocent without knowing activity must fall as an assertion of
arbitrary power."3 Employees of the state or municipality"4 or state
office-seekers" have been required to take oaths, but in these cases
due process required the language of the oaths to disclaim either
advocacy of overthrow of the government by unlawful means or
knowing membership in listed organizations which embraced that
philosophy. Mere membership in an organization does not provide
notice sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of due process.
Thus, the "any member" provision in the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act is insufficient to provide the necessary scienter.
B. Other Defects In The Statute
Had the act even required consideration of the degree of activity
in the party, it might have been sufficient without proof of actual
knowledge. Moreover, the purposes of the travel, according to the
Court, should have been considered as well as the security-sensitivity
of the areas in which travel is desired. The Court points out that the
restrictions do not include the Western Hemisphere, and that these
areas could also be very important to our national security, for often
Communist-inspired rebellions arise in the South American nations.
Travel to Ireland seems less dangerous to the United States than
travel to trouble spots such as Guatemala and Panama. Thus, it seems
that in determining whether a regulation was invalid, the Court put
' Wienan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
'164 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. 5 788(d) (1958).
'Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraf, 344 U.S, 183
(1952).
3344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
"Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951).
" Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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added emphasis on the possibility of less drastic means of regulation
being used. Mr. Justice Goldberg cited Mr. Justice Stewart's state-
ment in Shelton v. Tucker:"'
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legisla-
tive abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose."'
IV. THE "ON THE FACE" DOCTRINE EXTENDED
The Court here declared the Subversive Activities Control Act
invalid on its face."3 Mr. Justice Goldberg followed Thornhill v.
Alabama"' in which the Court, in holding an anti-picketing statute
invalid on its face, observed that with respect to regulations of the
liberty of free discussion there exist special reasons for following the
rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or evidence under it,
which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against
transgression.4' Similarly, the Court cited Staub v. City of Baxley "
in which the defendant was charged with soliciting members for
an organization without a permit. The Court declared the statute
requiring a permit unconstitutional on its face.
These cases, however, deal with first amendment freedoms, and
prior to Aptheker, which was decided on the basis of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, only statutes raising questions under
the first amendment were so treated. All other cases turned on the
particular facts presented. Mr. Justice Goldberg completely ignored
one of the most important of the latter cases, United States v.
Raines.4' There the Supreme Court, in considering the voter regis-
tration provision of the 1957 Civil Rights Act' as applied to a state
official, stated that "one to whom application of a statute is con-
stitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
36 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
3 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Instead of the state statute requiring
teachers to file an annual affidavit listing every organization to which he had belonged or
contributed, a more satisfactory means mights have been for the state to list certain or-
ganizations in the inquiry sufficiently related to the legitimate area of inquiry.
" The lower court ruled that the "sole question to be decided by this court is the con-
stitutional validity of the section in question as applied to the facts of these cases." Flynn
v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709, 712 (D.D.C. 1963).
a9 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
:ld. at 97-98.
4 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
42362 U.S. 17 (1960).
4371 Stat. 639 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958).
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impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or to
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.""
In Raines the Court reasoned that "application of this rule frees the
Court not only from unnecessary ... issues, but also from premature
interpretations of statutes in areas in which their constitutional ap-
plication might be cloudy." The Supreme Court considered the prob-
lem again in United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp." The
vague language of the Robinson-Patman Act made it a crime to sell
goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition. . .. "" The Court applied the terms of the statute only
to the large firm involved, and held that as applied to it, the statute
was constitutional. "The approach to 'vagueness' governing a case
like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the
first amendment. There we are concerned with the vagueness of the
statute 'on the face' because such vagueness may in itself deter con-
stitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct."'" The argu-
ment by Mr. Justice Goldberg that National Dairy Products can be
distinguished because it controls construction of vague language while
an attempt to construe the precisely-worded statute in Aptheker
would inject an element of vagueness seems, at best, unconvincing."
Aptheker was a top party leader who did not claim lack of notice
or lack of knowledge of the requirements of the statute. Thus, the
Court could not have declared the statute unconstitutional "if it had
followed these cases in which the Court considered the validity of the
statutes as applied only to the litigants in question. In this respect
the Supreme Court in Aptheker made a significant departure from
an established rule. The Supreme Court for the first time followed
the rationale of the first amendment cases in a situation other than
one involving such a first amendment freedom. Reconciliation of
the majority's views in Aptheker with earlier decisions such as Raines"
is impossible.
Mr. Justice Goldberg attempted to draw an analogy between the
facts of Aptheker and the first amendment rights: "[S]ince freedom
of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free
""United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
41 Id. at 22.
4"372 U.S. 29 (1963).
4749 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
"United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963).49 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964). Mr. Justice Goldberg's
comment that, "The clarity and preciseness of the provision in question make it impossible
to narrow its indiscriminately cast and overly broad scope without substantial rewriting,"
seems strikingly reminiscent of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in United States v. National Dairy
Products, 372 U.S. 29, 37 (1963), in which Mr. Justice Goldberg joined.
"'United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
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speech and association, we believe that appellants in this case should
not be required to assume the burden of demonstrating that Congress
could not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting their
travel."5' Many noted writers on the subject of freedom of travel
have also emphasized its close relationship to first amendment free-
doms. A leading authority has noted that travel abroad can play an
important part in keeping our citizens well-informed on the vital
issues of today by allowing us to gain our own impressions of people
and events." The first amendment, and indeed the entire conception
of an effectively functioning democratic society, rests on a belief in
the need for a free and fully informed exchange of opinion prior to
decision making." However plausible such an analogy may seem,
whether a "close relation" to the first amendment rights will restrict
the extension of this type of holding is uncertain. It is likely that the
Court will extend the practice of ruling on the constitutionality of
a statute in the abstract into the fields of other personal liberties. The
Aptheker decision in general language significantly proclaims: "Since
this case involves a personal liberty protected by the Bill of Rights,
we believe that the proper approach to legislation curtailing that
liberty must be that adopted by the Court in [the Button and
Thornhill cases-i.e., the 'on the face' approach] ..
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom of travel is recognized as a specific privilege which, while
not absolute, must be scrutinized from two angles. The Supreme
Court will ask (1) whether there is sufficient reason for the invasion
of the liberty and (2) whether there is any other less drastic manner
in which to regulate it. The Court attempts to restrict the invasion
of constitutional liberties to only necessary invasions instituted to
accomplish some sufficiently important purpose.
The question of the validity of a more precise regulation is left
open, but it is hoped that such controls might be allowed. It is sug-
gested that a statute applicable to active, knowing members should
be upheld without attaching burdensome and ineffective considera-
tions of the purpose of travel and the security-sensitivity of the
destination. However, the majority seems to prefer very stringent
safeguards. A probable solution might be a statute which required
the member to have knowledge of the aims of the Communist Party
and then, if the statute applied, a hearing. In the hearing such factors
" Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
"Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, 175 (1956).
'3 See Landis, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 6 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 455, 457-58 (1930).
14 Aptbeker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,- 516 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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